Philosophy\Epistemology\Contextualism
Contextualism in epistemology is a theory concerning the nature and scope of human knowledge. It asserts that the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions—that is, claims about what someone knows—are context-sensitive. The central idea is that the standards for knowing something can vary depending on various contextual factors such as the stakes involved, the particular doubts being considered, or the conversational context in which a knowledge claim is made.
Contextualism Defined
In traditional epistemology, knowledge is often analyzed through the tripartite definition of justified true belief. According to this classical approach, for a person \( S \) to know a proposition \( P \):
- \( P \) must be true.
- \( S \) must believe that \( P \).
- \( S \)’s belief in \( P \) must be justified.
Contextualism modifies this classical view by introducing the notion that the contextual standards play a critical role in whether or not a belief qualifies as knowledge. When someone claims to “know” something, the threshold for what constitutes sufficient justification can vary based on the context of the discussion.
Key Features of Contextualism
Context-Sensitivity: This is the hallmark of contextualism. The phrases “knows that” or “knows how” are sensitive to the epistemic standards present in the conversational context. A person might be said to know something in an everyday context but not in a context of philosophical scrutiny or high stakes.
Shifting Standards: The epistemic standards shift according to features such as the importance of the situation or the presence of skeptical challenges. For example, in low-stakes situations, where little depends on being right, the standards for saying someone knows something might be relatively low. In contrast, in high-stakes situations, where more is at risk, the standards are higher.
Skeptical Scenarios: Contextualists address skeptical scenarios (situations where we doubt almost everything we might claim to know) by arguing that in most everyday contexts, we do not apply the stringent standards that skeptics propose. Thus, while skeptics might argue that we “know” far less than we think, contextualism posits that this only holds in contexts where such extreme standards are relevant.
Illustrative Example
Consider a scenario where two individuals, Alice and Bob, are discussing whether Alice knows that her car is in the parking lot. In a regular conversation where not much hinges on the truth of this belief, the standards for Alice’s knowing this are relatively low: she saw her car there a few minutes ago, and it’s reasonable to believe it hasn’t moved.
However, if they were in a context where a high-stakes decision depended on the car being there (for instance, deciding whether to skip an important meeting based on needing the car for an emergency), the standards for “knowing” would be significantly higher. Alice might need additional evidence, such as checking the parking lot again or using a security camera, to confidently assert that her car is indeed in the parking lot.
Mathematical Representation
To represent this in a formal context, one might consider the conditional probability of \( S \)’s belief in \( P \) given the context \( C \), denoted as \( P(S \text{ believes } P \mid C) \). Contextualism would assert that:
\[ \text{if } C_1 \text{ and } C_2 \text{ are different contexts, } P(S \text{ knows } P \mid C_1) \neq P(S \text{ knows } P \mid C_2). \]
In essence, the likelihood of \( S \) being attributed knowledge of \( P \) is contingent on the context \( C \).
Conclusion
Contextualism provides a flexible framework for understanding knowledge by incorporating the variability of epistemic standards based on context. It stands as a significant position in contemporary epistemology, offering solutions to traditional problems such as skepticism and the varying conditions under which knowledge claims are made.